Tag Archives: The Guardian

Rape: Getting Away With It

In the aftermath of yet another woman’s death, following yet another rape trial acquittal, The Independent reported yet another scandal — hapless investigation and prosecution of sexual crime.

It is this impoverished process that gives men who want to rape women virtual impunity — individual immunity from prosecution; and that and thus a society that hardly knows or cares what happens to women.

It is not as if the police and criminal justice system don’t understand the politics of sexual crime and justice: In Britain we have emerged from three decades of dramatic discovery about the prevalence and meaning of rape, three decades of professional reviews and legal reform.

Until now, more and more women every year have come forward to report rape. But they have not been reciprocated by reformed policing or criminal justice systems.

In the 1980s, society was shocked by Roger Graef’s documentary on Thames Valley’s response to a woman reporting rape. In the 1990s the law and police processes were reformed. In the 2000s, Liz Kelly and her specialist scholars at London Met University reported that the rate of detection had slumped to the lowest ever; Betsy Stanko’s research into the Met’s files revealed shocking disdain for women reporting rape — and cases of known suspects who were never traced or investigated; the law was reformed, and it is as good as law on sexual crime anywhere.

To no avail.

I and others have been writing about this scandal for nearly a decade — here’s some of it:

Published on 16th April 2007, “Rape: The Truth

“Observations on criminal justice — the shocking failure
when it comes to rape prosecutions.”

New Statesman

Shocking evidence is circling the desks of the police and the Home Office showing that many men reported to the police for rape are not investigated, and their crimes do not appear in police records – even though they have previous records of violent offences and sexual attacks on women. Men rape with impunity and immunity, and they can do it again and again. Furthermore, as long as men target women who have been drinking or young women under 18, there is a good chance that the police won’t bother to interview or investigate, and the allegations won’t appear “on the books”.

New research commissioned by the Metropolitan Police delved into the Met’s own case files: it not only analysed the victims’ fates in the criminal justice system, but for the first time checked out the histories of the suspects. No one had carried out an offender profile of alleged rapists before. No one had correlated the victims’ stories with the records of the accused. The results are shattering.

Researchers reviewed the files on 677 rapes reported to the London Metropolitan Police in two months in 2005, and followed up by tracing the suspects. A third of the reported rapes were “not crimed” – that is, they were not investigated or recorded as crimes, because they were not thought to involve an offence. But many of the suspects had “previous”. More than half of the men accused of raping women who had been drinking, where the cases were “not crimed”, had a history of sexual offences against women.

A third of suspects whose victims were under 18 were not investigated, but had histories of violent offending. Among those cases that were crimed, but didn’t get past the police investigation stage, were some with known histories of offending who were not prosecuted, “in the public interest”.

This is sorely embarrassing for the macho (and besieged) Home Office. The evidence shows that the police directed their gaze at the wrong people. “We concentrated on services for victims,” comments Richard Sumray, a magistrate member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, “but we did not concentrate on offender profiles.”

One of the country’s pre-eminent researchers into sexual crimes against women, Professor Liz Kelly of London Metropolitan University, says the new findings are unprecedented. “This is unadulterated data that we’ve never had access to before.” It was Kelly’s research – based on the experiences of 3,500 victims – that in 2005 exposed the alarming collapse of the conviction rate. What was not apparent earlier (because it had not been correlated) was that men who like raping women do it over and over; they target their quarry.

It is the not-crimed category that is particularly sinister, officers giving up on cases without even checking up on the suspect. This is evidence that officials will want to keep out of the public domain, but which also vindicates reformers in the police service. The Met’s review — the largest of its kind — vindicates Kelly’s celebrated study that showed an unbroken increase in the numbers of women (and a few men) reporting rape in the past 20 years but a static number of convictions.

“The attrition rate [the rate of cases being not-crimed, not detected, or not pursued by the victim] is abominable,” comments Assistant Commissioner John Yates, who, as well as heading the Met’s cash-for-peerages inquiry, is also lead spokesman on rape for the Association of Chief Police Officers. “Rape is regarded as second only to murder, because of the violence and the violation, but most attrition takes place with us in the police,” he says. “My aim is to take best practice in scene management and forensics in cases like murder, and apply it to rape.”

The crisis comes from what Kelly calls a “culture of scepticism”. “The police are often quite willing to interview people who don’t support an account,” she says, “and they seldom follow up what supports it.”

If the not-crimed and attrition findings weren’t bad enough, the picture becomes even more disturbing when correlated with patterns of vulnerability among victims. The overwhelming majority of rape reports on the Met’s files – 87 per cent – are made by women whose characteristics make them vulnerable. Most are known to the perpetrators: acquaintances, partners and ex-partners; they are young; they consume alcohol or drugs; they suffer from mental illness. These categories attract police pessimism and a preoccupation with the virtues or vulnerabilities of the victim rather than the propensities of the perpetrators. This correlation appears to be decisive.

Pioneering research by Vanessa Munro at King’s College London transcended the ban on talking to British jury members by assembling jurors from the electoral register for mock trials. She found that although the law on consent was radically reformed by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 – requiring defendants to show that they had taken steps to ascertain consent, and requiring that the alleged victims had the capacity, choice and freedom to give consent – it still didn’t help them greatly. Some jurors felt that, however intoxicated, “as long as a woman was conscious she’d have the capacity to consent or resist”.

Sumray reckons that the crisis is multidimensional: cultural and political, as well as a policing problem. The political arena, he says, has “to begin to influence how people think about this”.

There is good news: the promotion of specialists in the Met’s dedicated Project Sapphire, and greater respect and care extended to victims by sexual assault referral centres. The Met’s response to research is already palpable; it reduced the number of rape reports dismissed as false allegations from 10 per cent in 2005 to 4 per cent in 2006, in line with Kelly’s estimate.

According to Kelly, however, given the sexism of the culture and British institutions: “Yes, a woman can get better care, but she still can’t get justice.”

Published on 13th November 2007, “Culture Victims

“In exploiting the rape crisis for political capital,
Cameron has ignored a wealth of new research.”

The Guardian, Gay Pride

David Cameron is right to talk about rape. Its prevalence and prosecution are a crisis. And it is full of complexity. But politicians, especially Tories, don’t do complicated. Cameron has done a typical Tory thing: invoke the disaster of rape for a moralistic, collapse-of-civilisation-as-we know-it populist agenda that has nothing to do with contemporary culture or policing. It ignores his own party’s history: Tory law-and-order debates have been animated by women’s laments about the beastliness of men since the 1930s; and it ignores the remarkable discoveries emerging from research into policing.

When Cameron talks about the rape crisis as a sign of “moral collapse” and sexualisation of the culture he is being lazy. Rape rates are not new: rape is nothing to do with “permissiveness”; it is a crime of dominion, as old as patriarchy itself. To pledge tougher laws exemplifies the Tory tradition: exploiting women’s humiliation and harm to promote populist – authoritarian – politics.

But explosive evidence from Scotland Yard – hitherto unpublished – shows the problem is not the law. The problem is still canteen culture, and it is still sexism that muddles the judgment of juries.

The reformed Sexual Offences Act, heavily influenced by women’s experience of sexual crime and by scrupulous (often feminist) research, is not to blame. The Association of Chief Police Officers agrees: the problem is what happens when a woman makes that first call to the police. And what happens at every step thereafter – right up to the appeal court. It is the “demonisation of women as a set of victims”, says the Acpo rape spokesman, Dave Gee.

The Guardian, Culture Victims, Bea Campbell

Buried in those processes is sinister evidence that a significant proportion of perpetrators are simply not investigated. Policing has got better at treating victims humanely. But it has been mesmerised by the worth of the victim, and averted its gaze from many of the suspects. The Met has been contemplating this evidence for nearly a year. It should have made it public. It should have seen it not as a source of more shame but as a resource for reform.

The story starts with a 2005 survey of rape victims, conducted by Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett and Linda Regan from London Metropolitan University. Their study, A Gap or a Chasm?, found that more women than ever had the confidence and courage to report rape, but fewer than ever achieved justice, not least because their cases entered a “culture of scepticism” and investigative inertia.

Acpo and the HMI inspectorate set out to find out why. Their report was published earlier this year, followed by a Home Office study of eight forces last July. All confirmed the study’s findings.

Next came some remarkable research at the Met. An independent team looked into all 677 rapes reported to the Met in two months of 2005. What they discovered challenged conventional wisdoms about victims and perpetrators. It found that men who like raping women target their victims and that these women cluster into the very groups least likely to attract police attention: those under 18; in present or past relationships with the perpetrators; living in domestically violent environments; under the influence of alcohol; suffering mental ill health. These groups constitute nearly 90% of reported rapes. Between half and a third of these reported rapes were not “crimed” – they don’t appear in the books. It gets worse. In half of the not-crimed cases involving alcohol, for example, the suspects had not been investigated, despite having a history of sex offences.

“Those in most need of caring and sympathy in the criminal justice system get smacked even more,” says Professor Betsy Stanko, who conducted the Met study. There is, then, a scandalous synergy between men who like raping women and police pessimism.

If the police haven’t made their evidence public it is because they don’t want to discourage women from reporting rape, and they can’t rely on politicians to get the story right. As Liz Kelly has pointed out, Cameron could have done something useful: he could have said the culture is hard to change, that appeal court judges’ prejudices are ricocheting through the criminal justice system, but that the Home Office and senior police officers are having a go. He could have said the huge investment in terrorism should be spent on “ordinary domestic and sexual terrorism”.

Tories – usually to great effect – have enlisted the experience of women as the victims of men, but never to empower women, and never to challenge the masculine cultures that sponsor crimes against women.

Published on 16th March 2010, “Stern Morphs into Pollyanna

“The rape review does a disservice to women from whom
police and courts have averted their gaze.”

The Guardian, Gay Pride

Will more women be encouraged to report rape if they’re told that Britain’s conviction for rape isn’t 6% but 58%? Undoubtedly the police would be able to feel proud, rather than ashamed, and the government could proclaim it had made a difference. But will this statistical manoeuvre empower women? Or will it avert our gaze from the failures of policing culture?

The Stern Review, published this week, argues that burying the bad news will encourage women to report, yield more convictions in the courts, and raise the level of optimism about policing. But why would it? The problem isn’t women: while only 2,800 reported rape in 1988, this was up to 13,093 by 2008; their courage and confidence grows year by year. Yet the police response has not raised conviction rates, and institutional scepticism rewards men who like raping women with impunity.

The Guardian, Stern Morphs into Pollyana, Bea Campbell

It was this paradox – more women reporting rape, reciprocated by the lowest conviction rate yet in the courts and, therefore, the dismal knowledge that society was averting its gaze from the most violent sexism– that prompted solicitor general Vera Baird and leader of the house Harriet Harman last summer to commission this review by Vivien Stern. She has done a disservice to the ministers. This could have been a great moment, says sexual violence expert Professor Liz Kelly – a moment to match Sir William Macpherson’s critique of institutional racism in the police. It has been squandered. During the last decade there has been a revolution in what is known about rape – to whom, and how it happens, and what happens next.

In 2005 the Home Office published research by Kelly and her colleagues at the Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit. In it, victims disclosed widespread scepticism among police officers. Rape is unique: women tend to know their assailants. But 15% of reported rapes are not even recorded as crimes. A further 20% of complaints are withdrawn – many women told researchers they had been encouraged to quit by police officers. A further 23% fall through; about a quarter of suspects are charged. Some 12% reach court, and finally only about 6% attract conviction for rape.

Instead of confronting that forlorn process head-on, Stern morphs into Pollyanna. Justice isn’t everything, she says, reassuring us anyway that half of the minority of cases that get to court result in a conviction for something or other. Worse, she suggests that we should now investigate the problem of false allegations. The police have already researched that, and in any case decent detection should deal with it.

Senior police officers were not so awed by the evidence. The Association of Chief Police Officers, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Home Office and the Met itself all looked into what was going on. They found some excellent practice but also routine, endemic failure to properly investigate rape.

The Met’s research was dynamite. It focused on more than 700 rapes reported over two months in 2005. Victims were clustered in groups of “vulnerability” – women who didn’t attract police interest or investigation. The Met took another look. A significant proportion of the men had never been checked out or tracked down. And a significant proportion, it emerged, already had records of violence and sex offences.

This is the dangerous matrix that alarmed ministers: men who like raping women target those who won’t engage police attention or confidence. That’s what Stern should have exposed: this toxic correlation, the institutional sexism that disarms rape investigation.

And, finally…

Check out this chilling review by scholars, into decades of troubled inquiry, reportage, research and reform of the dismal outcomes for women reporting rape and other sexual crimes to the police:

2011 – The Journal of Criminal Justice Research (JCJR) – Volume 1, Number 2



Miranda A.H. Horvath, University of Surrey
Stephen Tong, Canterbury Christ Church University
Emma Williams, Metropolitan Police Service


….Criminal investigation is …based on discretionary decisions made by detectives. Reiner (2000: 93-94) points to “police property” as a category of crime left to the police to deal with by the “dominant powers of society?. Within this category are a group identified as ”rubbish”, reflecting “messy”, “unworthy” offences that maybe be perceived as the “complainants fault”. Crimes that can fall within this category include rape, domestic violence or hate crime…

…“messy” investigations (long protracted cases where the officer may have some doubts regarding the integrity of the complaint), or unworthy of attention (the officer believes the event is not an offence but a private matter, or a trivial event) or finally the complainants fault (the officer believes the complainant contributed to their own victimisation) …

….The belief that investigative work simply required “common sense” with low levels of education, the lack of research aimed at improving investigative practice, the slow pace of change to past and current criticisms and evidence of a continued presence of negative attitudes towards marginalised groups remain barriers to improving investigative standards in England and Wales.

…Although some progress has been made especially in the care of victims and some re-shaping of the law to reflect modern notions of sexual autonomy many of the reforms have failed to be effective or have not been fully implemented.

Key criminal justice reforms in the last thirty years in England and Wales.

…In the 1980’s criminal justice reform was spurred on initially by Roger Graef’s documentary “A complaint of rape”, which showed oppressive interviewing of a rape victim by Thames Valley police officers and subsequently by a joint publication from the Women’s Aid Federation and Women Against Rape that suggested detailed requirements in police procedures in the investigation of rape. This resulted in the Home Office issuing a number of circulars (25/83 and 69/86) requiring police to revise their procedures.

The nineties began with significant changes in the law…The nineties ended with a Sex Offences Review, which began in 1999. The review aimed to achieve “protection, fairness and justice? within the Home Office’s overall aim of creating a “safe, just and tolerant society” (Home Office, 2000b). It sought to review sex offences in England and Wales and make recommendations to provide much more coherent and clear sex offences, ensure perpetrators are punished appropriately and abide by the ECHR and Human Rights Act so as not to be discriminatory.

The Sexual Offences Act (SOA) 2003 came into effect from May 2004: Amongst the many changes it Act introduced are the meaning of rape to include oral penetration as well as vaginal and anal with the penis; a legal definition of consent; children under thirteen years old can never now legally consent to sexual activity.

…Crown Prosecutors took over deciding if the defendant should be charged in serious cases including rape. This is just one of many moves in England and Wales which seem to be developing best practice towards a more American style approach to dealing with rape where investigators and prosecutors work closely on cases, continually consulting and advising one another.

….The 2007 HMCPSI report assessed the progress against the recommendations in the 2002 inspections:

…despite the many efforts directed at improving and making more consistent responses to victims the picture does not appear to have changed substantially over the last decade.

The review of the Metropolitan police rape cases by Prof Elizabeth Stanko discovered four categories of vulnerability – victims appeared to be targeted:

In 87% of the cases analysed victims displayed more than one of these vulnerabilities, this was confirmed in a subsequent study using data from the same force but from a different time period (Horvath & Kelly, 2009), and patterns of attrition differed depending on the type of vulnerability involved.

Police work has been hindered by performance regimes influenced by efficiency savings and private sector principles of measurement that do not necessarily recognise the complexities or duties of public sector practitioners particular in the context of the investigation of sexual offences.

Plebgate Morphs into Plodgate

Black Bodies, Women’s Bodies: Spectres Haunting the Police

Representatives of the Police Federation are called to explain themselves to a Parliamentary committee in November 2013.

After being accused of trying to discredit a government minister, they themselves are suffering a credibility deficit.

Their problem is larger, however, than the odd row about what the minister, Andrew Mitchell, did or did not say to police officers on his way out of Downing Street. He had been forced to resign after swearing at police officers at the Downing Street gate.

Mitchell admits swearing at the police officers, but denies calling them plebs (why would ‘pleb’ be more or less offensive than other four-letter words?) .

The row shifted from shaming a minister to shaming the police.

The Parliamentary encounter with the Police Federation synchronises with trouble rumbling along many flanks for the police, from illegal phone hacking to failure to protect children from neglect and murder and a new low in the rate of rape prosecutions.

Despite intense scrutiny of responses to rape — accelerated by the Savile scandal — the Met are reporting fewer rape cases to the Crown Prosecution Service. This is a crisis.

Let’s focus on race: in two cases black bodies return to haunt the Metropolitan Police service and its history of institutional racism. Azelle Rodney and Mark Duggan would be alive today had they not been shot and killed by the police.

Azelle Rodney:

Sir Christopher Holland’s report, The Azelle Rodney Inquiry, published on 5 April 2013, describes what happened when the police, alerted by customs (who believed that Rodney and two other men were on their way to commit robbery) organized a chase.

The police did not know the identity of the men’s targets, nor did they know the identities of two of the three suspects.

The Metropolitan Police mobilized surveillance and firearms officers from SCD11 and CO19, together with detectives, in accordance with a strategy known as Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS), to keep the suspects in sight until they had enough evidence for an arrest.

They would stop the suspects and the detectives would arrest them, using the ‘hard stop’ by boxing in the men’s VW Golf, and shock them into compliance with a display of overwhelming force.

That was the plan. It was also the plan that E7 would remain inside his vehicle, with his weapon covering other officers as they got into position during the hard stop.

But when the police cars brought the suspects to a halt, ‘almost instantaneously’ E7, instead of providing cover, began firing a burst of shots at Azelle Rodney. Holland’s report said that he did so with such speed that witnesses, ‘believed it to have been an automatic weapon firing. He fired six shots in one burst. He then paused and fired two more shots.’

The weapon still lying beside Rodney, hidden by a yellow cover, unused, was a de-activated automatic pistol that ‘would not fire even if loaded.’

Azelle Rodney was not arrested. He was shot dead. The Independent Police Complaints Commission found nothing in this operation to criticise.

The European Convention on Human Rights Article 2 requires the government to properly inquire into such an event, to bring full facts to light and to allay fears — if possible — of wrongdoing.

No inquest was held because of ‘sensitive intelligence’. Indeed, ‘a great deal of time’ was spent fruitlessly in Parliament to find a way ‘to permit a thorough and sufficiently open inquest’.

Finally, belatedly, the Lord Chancellor in 2010 established Holland’s inquiry.

Holland expended considerable effort to ensure that evidence could be heard in public about that sensitive intelligence. His report criticized the operational management of the killing:

  • The officers involved in the surveillance — two surveillance cars were parked near the men when they picked up the weapons — should have stopped them much earlier.
  • They should have stopped in a road more suitable for a hard stop, rather than the final destination: a pub where customers were sitting outside.
  • There they — wrongly — rammed the car.
  • Officers didn’t wear caps indicating that they were police.
  • Shots supposed — according to the MASTS protocol — to deflate tyres of a fleeing car, were fired into the rammed, hemmed in and stationary Golf.

Although E7’s view of Rodney was poor, he first fired into the car ‘only 1.11 seconds’ after his vehicle stopped alongside him.

Rodney was slumped forward, still wearing his seat belt, when the final shots were fired into his head as he slumped forward. It was the three final shots that were fatal. The first burst took 1.11 seconds. The second burst 0.21 seconds.

Was it plausible for E7 to believe, ‘for good reason’, that Rodney threatened his life? ‘The answer is that he did not,’ said the report. And even if it had been proportionate to fire at all, ‘there would have been no basis’ for firing those final fatal shots.

Once Azelle Rodney was pulled out of the car he was left on the pavement for 16 hours. No one with ‘sufficient seniority or common sense’ to manage the situation was put in charge of this bloody scene. His death attracted neither discipline nor decorum.

When Rodney’s relatives were brought to his body, his blood was still on the pavement. Press reports were freely circulating without proper authorization, there was no proper debriefing, and when the Met then got itself legal representation, it failed to distinguish, said Holland, between its responsibility as an employer, and its responsibility for operations.

Mark Duggan:

In September 2013, the inquest began in court 73 at the Royal Courts of Justice in London’s Strand into the death of Mark Duggan, shot to death by armed police at Tottenham Hale in August 2011.

When they killed Duggan, the Met was already mired in the Rodney co disaster. Was the Met chastened?

The characters were different, but the issues were the same: a police operation involving surveillance of a man whilst he acquired a weapon and travelled in a car; a hard stop, followed by the fatal shooting.

Mark Duggan’s family had difficulty ascertaining how and why he had died. The Met lost its manners: Relatives waited for an appropriate officer to talk to them whilst the death swirled in public misinformation — not least by the IPCC. But it was fire this time: the Met’s behavior provoked a vigil and later riots in which another four people lost their lives.

In November an expert witness told the inquest that the police were wrong to claim that the first shot fired into Duggan struck his chest. This was supposedly the fatal shot. But pathologist, Professor Derrick Pounder, told the inquest that Duggan was first shot in his arm. Evidence on the order of the fatal wound is decisive.

The inquest is concerned with the cause of Duggan’s death — he was killed after he collected a gun from a man known to the police: Duggan met with Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, toward the end of the afternoon of 4th August 2011 and received a shoebox containing a pistol wrapped in a sock.

He got into a Toyota mini-cab. On his way to Tottenham he was kept under surveillance by Operation Trident.

Within 15 minutes Duggan knew he was being followed, the car was hard-stopped by a team of officers at Tottenham Hale, and within a mere 2 seconds he is shot twice: first in the arm then, fatally, in the chest.

At first the public was led to infer that Duggan had shot a police officer who had been saved — the bullet hit his car radio. But the IPCC was forced admit a few days later that it may have led journalists to believe that ‘shots were exchanged’.

In fact, two shots were fired, neither of them from the gun in the sock, both by a police firearms specialist, known as W70.

Professor Pounder explained that the first shot hit Duggan’s arm while he was sitting upright, and the second shot hit him when he was ‘significantly bent forward’. Had Duggan been standing upright – as police witness V53 had claimed – then it would not have been possible for the bullet to follow a 46-degree trajectory inside his body.

The supervision of the inquiry into the killing by the IPCC also became the subject of grave concern. Before the year was out, Stafford Scott, chair of the Tottenham Defence Campaign (a veteran human rights campaigner in Tottenham) and John Noblemunn, chair of the Haringey Black Independent Advisory Group resigned from the community panel monitoring the investigation.

Stafford Scott, chair of the Tottenham Defence Campaign and a veteran human rights campaigner in Tottenham, London, UK

Stafford Scott, chair of the Tottenham Defence Campaign

The IPCC had denied and then admitted that it sanctioned the removal of the taxi carrying Duggan from the crime scene — and then its return.

The community reference group had been given outstanding information, indicative of an IPCC in a mess:

“We were told that at least three officers had given a statement that they had witnessed another officer, a sergeant, throwing away the gun that was later found several feet from Duggan’s body. When we sought to identify the officers involved, we were told there was no evidence to support the allegation – that this statement was in fact never given. Yet we were informed by the commissioner that it had been.”

In a statement immediately after the incident, one of the officers nearest to Duggan, known as W70, did not refer to any gun held by Duggan.

But in a further statement written four days later, he said he saw Duggan get out of the car with his hand inside his jacket, as if concealing something, he pivoted, drew his hand from his waistband ‘he was holding a self-loading pistol or handgun.’

That was his evidence to the criminal case against Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, the man who had given Duggan ‘the shoe box with the gun in a sock.’

But by the time Duggan had been shot, he was falling and W70 said he grabbed him by the wrists. There was no gun.

Officer W70 told the inquest into Duggan’s death in October 2013 that his legal advice had been to include no details in his notes. In his evidence to the inquest he insisted that Duggan had not dropped the gun or thrown it away.

The gun in the sock was actually found by firearms expert R31, during a search after the shooting, about 5 metres away from the body, behind a fence. Forensic examination confirmed that the gun had not been used — more than that, Mark Duggan had not touched it. There were none of his fingerprints on the sock or the gun.

A military surgeon, Professor Jonathan Clasper, gave evidence to the inquest in November. He said that it was ‘very unlikely’ that Duggan could have hurled the gun the 7.5 metres where it was found after the shooting.

In a sequence of events similar to the shooting of Azelle Rodney, Duggan’s death was being broadcast on the television before his family had been informed. Years of investment in community consultation and good manners were squandered.

The trial of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was a used as a proxy to put Duggan himself on trial. What it actually confirmed was a crisis in Operation Trident. According to Stafford Scott, a notorious young man with a history of violence using firearms had been allowed to stay on the streets.

Operation Trident had been set up on the initiative of black campaigners in response to what Claudia Webbe — one of the founders — describes as ‘woeful’ policing of gun crime that disproportionately assailed black neighbourhoods in the early ‘90s.

“Back then, while the culture of gun crime affected whole communities and neighbourhoods, 90% of homicide victims were black, mainly black men. The police response was woeful, using criminal “informants” who were themselves allowed to get away with so-called lesser crimes. Delroy Denton, for example, was left free to brutally rape a 15-year-old schoolgirl and murder Marcia Lawes, slashing her throat 18 times; and Eaton Green was allowed to continue dealing crack cocaine and committing armed robbery.”

Operation Trident was finally established as a dedicated police unit with 200 officers and a remit to not only make London safer for black people but also to communicate with and consult black people.

The killings of Azelle Rodney and Mark Duggan, and the response to them, were a portent of things to come.

The police inspectorate, HMIC, reports that almost a third of stop and search exercises by the police lack reasonable grounds; the national arrest rate is a meager 9 per cent, in London it is 21 per cent — but black people are seven times more likely to be stopped than whites. Plus ça change.

Claudia Webbe protests that, without community consultation, London mayor Boris Johnson changed the remit and locus of Operation Trident. It has not only lost its specialist black focus, but also inevitably its commitment to consultation — the very essence of ‘community policing’.

The deaths of Azelle Rodney and Mark Duggan — and the deaths of four others in the riots — are the price paid not only for problematic policing, but hapless oversight by the IPCC. Its days are surely numbered.

Yvette Cooper, shadow Home Secretary, has warned that it may be replaced. There is talk of a Policing Ombudsman.

But let’s turn our gaze to Northern Ireland: there the first Policing Ombudsman appointed as part of the peace treaty that ended 30 years of armed conflict was the reserved but robust lawyer, Nuala O’Loan.

Her tenure proved to be one of the most radical in the new Northern Ireland. More than anyone before or since she uncovered scorching evidence of collusion between the British state and loyalist paramilitaries in the killing of British citizens. The British government chose not to retain her brave services. Since then the office of the Policing Ombudsman has been degraded to the point of collapse.

Bodies like the IPCC and the Ombudsman only work if they are allowed to, and if their professional resources are amplified by the wisdoms of the people they are supposed to serve.

From Jasmine Beckford to Daniel Pelka: a history of chaos and calumny

In three decades of child protection, an alliance between state and children has been compromised by the compliance culture.

Read more of my article in The Guardian

From Jasmine Beckford to Daniel Pelka: a history of chaos and calumny by Beatrix Campbell

Click to read more…